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In this short commentary, I want to focus on just one aspect of one of Jovičić's "new 
concepts" for argument evaluation -- her proposed new definition of fallacies -- and raise a series 
of questions of clarification about that definition. 
Jovičić suggests that a fallacy ought to be understood as a dialogue move (or a dialogue 
shift) which satisfies two further individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. First, 
the dialogue move must be inappropriate, in the sense that it violates one or more of the rules 
governing the dialogue within which that move is embedded. Second, this inappropriate move 
must, in some sense, appear to constitute an appropriate move. So there's something inherently 
deceptive or misleading about any fallacious move. Those who commit fallacies, on this account, 
are tricksters of some sort. It's this second condition which most interests, and most puzzles me. 
Suppose that some Proponent utters a proposition P within some dialogue D where 
Proponent's utterance of P violates one or more of the rules governing exchanges within D. Then 
Proponent is halfway towards committing a fallacy. Whether Proponent satisfies the second 
condition, however, depends upon how we interpret that condition, and there are subtle 
differences within Jovičić's discussion. 
One possibility is that, in uttering P, Proponent has deliberately or intentionally 
articulated P in such a way that it will seem to her audience that P is an appropriate move, when 
Proponent realizes that it is not. This interpretation is at least suggested by Jovičić's remark that 
"a logical fallacy is committed when an inappropriate dialogue move is made so as to make it 
seem to constitute a proper part of the discussion" (p.9, my emphasis). 
Call this the intentional reading of the second condition. On this reading, in order to 
commit a fallacy, Proponent must deliberately attempt to conceal from her audience the 
inappropriate nature of her own speech act. She must, that is, understand herself to be engaged in 
an act which is both illicit and deceptive -- illicit because it's a violation of the dialogical rules, 
and deceptive because the speech act is intentionally presented in such a way as to disguise its 
illicit nature. 
This intentional reading demands a lot of Proponent. In order to commit a fallacy on this 
reading, Proponent must understand the rules governing her dialogical exchange well enough to 
realize that her move is illicit, and she must have a rich enough understanding of her audience so 
that she is able to devise a strategy which will, or has some chance of misleading them. Basically, 
she must intend to deceive. 
Elsewhere, however, Jovičić's language suggests a weaker reading. Again on (p.9) she 
writes that fallacies are inappropriate dialogue moves which are "presented in a specific way ... 
so that the opposite party in a discussion cannot easily recognize them as improper discussion 
moves." Here there's no (or at least less) suggestion of deceitful intent, and so no requirement 
that Proponent understands the rules of her dialogical exchange well enough to appreciate that 
her behaviour may mislead others. On this behavioural reading, Proponent commits a fallacy by 
uttering P in such a way that P's illicit nature is not (likely to be) apparent to her audience; where 
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there is no suggestion of willful manipulation on Proponent's part. 
The fact that the true nature of P's illicit behaviour is concealed from her audience could 
be explained, on this account, by appealing to various empirical generalizations or widely 
accepted public norms governing the interpretation of argumentative discourse. Something along 
the lines, for example, of: whenever a speaker overtly behaves in such-and-such a way, others 
will (likely) interpret her to be making such-and-such an (appropriate) dialogue move (even 
though her move is in fact illicit). On the behavioural reading, Proponent may not be aware of 
the truth of claims of this sort, although they explain why her behaviour is fallacious. 
So there's a subtle ambiguity running throughout Jovičić's account, as to what's required 
of Proponent in order for Proponent to commit a fallacy. There's a related ambiguity concerning 
what's required of Proponent's audience -- Respondent -- as well. 
On her nine-point evaluative scale, Jovičić locates fallacies near the bottom, at level 
seven, under the category heading "Unacceptable, but Effective." A fallacy, that is, is effective in 
misleading an audience. This suggests that Proponent commits a fallacy in uttering P only if she 
succeeds in deceiving Respondent regarding the illicit nature of her speech act. A weaker 
requirement is that a fallacy is committed, within a particular dialogical exchange, just so long as 
there is a substantial risk that Respondent will be misled by, or deceived about the true nature 
of Proponent's move. 
Combining these two sets of variables generates four possible characterizations of the 
conditions which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the commission of a fallacy; 
based on four possible interpretations of Jovicic's second condition 
                              
     Intentional       Behavioural 
                Success  1                      2 
                Risk   3           4 
 
According to quadrant 1, Proponent commits a fallacy in uttering P only if, in uttering P, 
she intends to deceive her audience, and she succeeds in deceiving them. 
According to quadrant 3, Proponent commits a fallacy in uttering P only if, in uttering P, 
she intends to deceive her audience, and there is a substantial risk that they will be deceived. 
According to quadrant 2, Proponent commits a fallacy in uttering P only if she utters P in 
a manner which causes her audience to fail to recognize P's illicit nature. 
According to quadrant 4, Proponent commits a fallacy in uttering P only if she utters P in 
a manner which creates a substantial risk that her audience will fail to recognize P's illicit nature. 
If there is time, Jovičić may wish to comment upon which, if any, of these interpretations 
she's willing to endorse. But any discussion of the relative merits of these various interpretations 
ought to be predicated upon a prior understanding of what kind of work we want the concept of a 
fallacy to do for us. 
Suppose, to consider just one possibility, that we want to say that someone who commits 
a fallacy is culpable of some act of communicative or argumentative wrongdoing. Jovičić's first 
condition captures well the notion of wrongdoing; namely, the violation of a dialogical rule. 
Different interpretations of her second condition flesh out culpability, or responsibility for 
wrongdoing in different ways. 
Intentional accounts provide the strongest connection with culpability. If someone 
consciously intends to deceive others then, bizarre causal sequences aside, there's a clear sense in 
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which they are culpable for any deception which results. But the two intentional accounts 
described above may not be strong enough. Suppose Proponent is just grossly inept at deceiving 
others. Therefore, while she may regularly violate rules and intend to deceive others, and thus 
engage in culpable wrongdoing, she'll rarely, if ever, succeed in actually deceiving others, or in 
creating a substantial risk that others will be deceived. So this Proponent, though culpable of 
wrongdoing, never (or rarely) commits a fallacy on accounts (1) and (3). 
The behavioural accounts (2) and (4) make weaker demands insofar as they are capable of 
assigning fallacious behaviour to individuals who possess no intention to deceive. There is of 
course something right about this, since one can unwittingly, yet still culpably deceive others 
through negligent or reckless behaviour. Proponent may have no intent to deceive, yet she may 
violate dialogical rules in a manner which in fact leads to the deception of others. Proponent is 
responsible for this deception, at least in those cases in which she ought to have known that 
others would (likely) misinterpret her behaviour. So it makes sense that a fallacy could be 
committed without any intention to deceive. 
Still, (2) and (4) seem to err along a different dimension, insofar as they fail to 
acknowledge that audiences too may bear (some) responsibility for failing to recognize the illicit 
nature of someone else's speech act. Suppose that Proponent, as a joke, violates a dialogical rule 
in such a deliberately blatant and exaggerated fashion that she never imagines that anyone will 
take her seriously. That is, she engages in wrongdoing non-culpably, since she reasonably 
assumes that her violation of the dialogical rule will be so transparent that there is no risk of 
deceiving anyone. Still, her audience happens to be so gullible, or obtuse, or so ill-informed 
about communicative norms that they fail to perceive P's illicit nature and misinterpret Proponent 
to be making an appropriate dialogue move. So on accounts (2) and (4), Proponent commits a 
fallacy, in the absence of culpable wrongdoing on her part. 
None of the accounts articulated above, therefore, seem entirely up to the task of 
capturing an understanding of fallacies as consisting of argumentative acts of culpable 
wrongdoing. 
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